End-to-end encryption
What the server cannot read, what it still sees, and where the limits are.
Two things are encrypted end to end on a Tiny server, separately: calls, and text in conversations created encrypted. In both, the keys belong to members’ devices. Signing in does not grant decryption, and the server holds no key that opens the content.
Calls
Every call is encrypted between each app and the server. On top of that, when every app in a call can, the apps form one group and seal each audio frame and the picture themselves. The server relays the group’s messages and does not hold its secret, so it cannot hear or see those frames. The design is MLS, as in Discord’s DAVE protocol, version 1.
tinyclient says which of the two a call is:
| The call says | Meaning |
|---|---|
| End-to-end encrypted | Only people in this call can hear it. |
| Encrypted to the server | Encrypted between each app and the server. The server could hear this call. |
- One app that cannot do it turns the call to encrypted-to-the-server for everyone, and the others are told who. The call goes back when that person leaves.
- A room set to require end-to-end encryption refuses an app that cannot, so the call never drops down. It is a setting on the room; there is no server-wide switch.
- A member can also choose, in tinyclient’s own settings, to join only end-to-end encrypted calls.
- A call between two people is end-to-end encrypted when both apps can.
Call codes and safety numbers
- The call code is 30 digits, the same for everyone in the call, and changes whenever someone joins or leaves. If two people read out different codes, something sits between them.
- A safety number is 45 digits for a pair of people. Compare it in person or over another channel you trust; both of you see the same number. After you mark someone verified, the app warns you if their key changes.
What the server still sees in a call
Who is in which call and when, who is speaking and how loudly, the size and timing of packets, and each participant’s address. A server can also force a call down to encrypted-to-the-server, which the apps show, and can add a member nobody has verified. Verifying safety numbers is what catches that.
That a room requires encryption is a promise the server makes, not one an app can check from outside.
Text and files
From tinyclient 0.2.37, a conversation created encrypted seals message text, edits, replies, and attachment contents, names and types on the sending device. The server stores ciphertext.
- Direct conversations are created encrypted. A channel is encrypted only when it was made that way or later upgraded.
- Upgrading leaves earlier messages as they were, readable by the server. There is no way back to plaintext.
- The app labels each conversation. A plaintext one says the server can read it.
Someone who manages the server sets the policy for the whole community:
| Policy | Effect |
|---|---|
off | No encrypted conversations |
optional (the default) | A conversation may be created encrypted |
new_required | Every new conversation is encrypted |
required | Every conversation is encrypted |
What the server still sees
Who is in the conversation, who posted and in which minute, how large each message is, how many attachments it has and their sizes, each person’s list of devices, and addresses while connected.
Devices and history
- A new member, or a new device, cannot read messages from before it joined.
- Linking a device carries history over. In tinyclient, Server Settings › Encryption on the device you already have accepts the new device’s link code; check its fingerprint before approving. The old device then hands over an archive the server cannot read. A link lasts five minutes.
- There is no key backup. Someone who loses every device starts again with a new identity and no old history. Signing back in does not bring it back.
- The first device of a person is trusted the first time it is seen.
Limits to know
- Sealed files are never virus scanned: the server could scan only ciphertext.
- Moderators cannot delete a message in an encrypted conversation, and bots cannot post there.
- The server cannot search encrypted text or make previews of it.
- A person removed from a conversation keeps what they already received.
- The server can withhold or delay messages. It cannot read or change them.
- A hostile operator could add an account of its own to an encrypted conversation.
- tinyclient keeps messages you have opened in its own store on your computer, in plaintext. The app’s privacy page says what is stored there.
Not independently reviewed. Neither the call encryption nor the text encryption has had an outside security review or a cryptographic audit.
For the person who runs the server
- The server’s own key for encrypted conversations is a file on the
tinyserver_keysvolume, not a row in the database. Members’ apps pin it.operator.sh backupcarries it; a plain database dump does not. - Scanning can be turned off only for a community whose attachments are all sealed.
The protocols, frame formats and threat models are in the repository: docs/calls.md for calls and docs/e2ee-text.md for text.