End-to-end encryption

What the server cannot read, what it still sees, and where the limits are.

Two things are encrypted end to end on a Tiny server, separately: calls, and text in conversations created encrypted. In both, the keys belong to members’ devices. Signing in does not grant decryption, and the server holds no key that opens the content.

Calls

Every call is encrypted between each app and the server. On top of that, when every app in a call can, the apps form one group and seal each audio frame and the picture themselves. The server relays the group’s messages and does not hold its secret, so it cannot hear or see those frames. The design is MLS, as in Discord’s DAVE protocol, version 1.

tinyclient says which of the two a call is:

The call saysMeaning
End-to-end encryptedOnly people in this call can hear it.
Encrypted to the serverEncrypted between each app and the server. The server could hear this call.

Call codes and safety numbers

What the server still sees in a call

Who is in which call and when, who is speaking and how loudly, the size and timing of packets, and each participant’s address. A server can also force a call down to encrypted-to-the-server, which the apps show, and can add a member nobody has verified. Verifying safety numbers is what catches that.

That a room requires encryption is a promise the server makes, not one an app can check from outside.

Text and files

From tinyclient 0.2.37, a conversation created encrypted seals message text, edits, replies, and attachment contents, names and types on the sending device. The server stores ciphertext.

Someone who manages the server sets the policy for the whole community:

PolicyEffect
offNo encrypted conversations
optional (the default)A conversation may be created encrypted
new_requiredEvery new conversation is encrypted
requiredEvery conversation is encrypted

What the server still sees

Who is in the conversation, who posted and in which minute, how large each message is, how many attachments it has and their sizes, each person’s list of devices, and addresses while connected.

Devices and history

Limits to know

Not independently reviewed. Neither the call encryption nor the text encryption has had an outside security review or a cryptographic audit.

For the person who runs the server

The protocols, frame formats and threat models are in the repository: docs/calls.md for calls and docs/e2ee-text.md for text.

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